13 YEARS SINCE BOOKINGPROJECT LICENSE CANCELLED 28.04.202667 BUYERS ON THE FIR90 ALLOTTEES ON THE WRIT175 BUYERS BEHIND THE PMO & CM COMPLAINTFIR 134/26 · PS EOWWRIT 27430/2026 · ALLAHABAD HC₹0 REFUNDED0% POSSESSION 13 YEARS SINCE BOOKINGPROJECT LICENSE CANCELLED 28.04.202667 BUYERS ON THE FIR90 ALLOTTEES ON THE WRIT175 BUYERS BEHIND THE PMO & CM COMPLAINTFIR 134/26 · PS EOWWRIT 27430/2026 · ALLAHABAD HC₹0 REFUNDED0% POSSESSION
An account by homebuyers of Sushant Megapolis, Dadri — FIR filed, writ pending

We were sold a green city on 2,500 acres. Thirteen years later, we own a payment ledger and a stalled plot.

In 2013, Ansal Hi-Tech Townships Ltd sold units at Sushant Megapolis by putting the Ansal name — Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Ltd — in every brochure, every receipt, every meeting. We paid. Construction did not reach the stages we paid for. On 28 April 2026, the U.P. government cancelled the project's township license outright. This page lays out what we were told, what we paid, and where the case stands now — a criminal complaint, and a High Court writ asking the court to force completion instead of leaving the land to be reallocated.

13
Years since booking, no possession
67 / 90
Buyers on the FIR / allottees on the writ
175+
Families united under AMVA, writing to the PMO and CM
28.04.26
Date the state cancelled the project's license

This is what was shown to us.

Every image below is from material actually handed to a buyer at the time of booking — sent by an Ansal API sales executive, on Ansal API letterhead, describing an "Ansal project." These are the pages that were used to close the sale.

Sushant Megapolis brochure page, 'A different City. A different Lifestyle', Ansal API branding
Sushant Megapolis brochure, sales overview pageAnsal API
Sushant Megapolis location map brochure page with metro, freight corridor and expressway markings
Location map, floor plans and contact pageAnsal API
Rendered elevation of the Freesia independent floors, from the Ansal API floors brochure
"Freesia — Space You Can Use Your Way", floors brochureAnsal API
Specifications page from the Ansal API floors brochure listing structure, flooring, doors, windows and fittings
Promised specifications, floors brochureAnsal API
  • 01A UP Govt.–approved, gazetted, notified green hi-tech township spread over 2,500 acres.Brochure, "Sushant Megapolis — An Overview"
  • 02Metro connectivity, a proposed rail-over-bridge and a regular train shuttle to New Delhi Railway Station.Brochure, location map
  • 03Five natural lakes, a grand canal, waterfront boulevards, a clean and pollution-free environment.Brochure, "An Overview"
  • 04Possession within 3–4 years of booking.Sworn statement, para on assurances given
  • 05The promoter was Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Ltd (APIL), in day-to-day control, with the Ansal family standing behind the project.Sworn statement, assurances given at booking
  • 06If there was any delay, the promoters would pay interest and would be answerable in law.Sworn statement, assurances given at booking
  • 07An earthquake-resistant structure, imported or Indian marble flooring in the living and dining rooms, laminated or wooden flooring in the master bedroom, and granite kitchen counters with a modular fit-out.Floors brochure, "Specifications"
  • 08"Independent Floors with Expandable Options" — Freesia, Zinnia and Daffodil homes sized from 1,244 sq.ft. up to 2,646 sq.ft., each marketed as customisable to the buyer's own plan.Floors brochure, product pages

This is the schedule we paid into.

The construction-linked payment plan below is copied from the actual builder-buyer payment schedule issued with the unit. Buyers paid on time against the first four milestones. The stages after that — the ones that involve actually building anything — were never billed, because they were never reached.

Stages 1–4: actual due dates, from the builder's own payment ledger. Stages 5–13: never billed — the tentative months below are our estimate of when they'd have fallen, spread across the "3–4 years" possession window promised at booking, not dates the builder ever confirmed.
5
On start of excavation— tentatively ~2014
10%
6
On completion of ground floor roof slab— tentatively ~2015
10%
7
On completion of first floor roof slab— tentatively ~2015
10%
8
On completion of second floor roof slab— tentatively ~2015
10%
9
On start of internal plumbing & electrical work— tentatively ~2016
10%
10
On start of internal plaster— tentatively ~2016
10%
11
On start of flooring of rooms— tentatively ~2016
10%
12
On start of external plaster— tentatively ~2017
5%
13
At the time of offer of possession— promised by ~2017
5%
On site, February 2024: a buyer visiting the plot found no work in progress and no one present who could give a straight answer. Stage 5 — the start of excavation — has, on this record, still not been billed to buyers who booked in 2013. These are delays in construction, not delays caused by court proceedings — the FIR and the writ came years after the site had already gone quiet, not before it.
Earlier still: the 2013 booking wave shown above is not where this project starts. In the case team's own consent-collection drive, the earliest recorded booking is from January 2007, with 19 buyers booking in 2008 alone and bookings continuing every year through 2013 before tapering off. That matches what the project's own formal complaint to the PMO and Chief Minister states directly: a 15-to-17-year delay "since 2008–2009." We haven't yet built out a full stage-by-stage schedule for that earlier period — the document above is the first project's construction-linked payment plan, issued from 2013 — but the booking dates on file are real, sourced from buyers' own consent forms, not estimated.

Same project, three different states of finished.

These photographs are from the project's own site-documentation annexure, GPS-tagged to the project boundary. They are not before/after shots of one building — they show what was true across the township at the same time: a few streets that were actually finished, towers left as bare concrete frames, and plots that never got past steel rods in the ground.

2016 revised supplementary development master plan for Hi-Tech City, Dadri, filed by the Uttam Steels & Associates consortium
The approved master plan, Hi-Tech City Dadri — Supplementary Development Plan, Nov 2016, filed by the Uttam Steels & Associates consortiumOfficial planning document
"I would never have paid out of my own life savings if this had been offered to me as a project of some unknown company. I paid because I trusted the Ansal name. That was the inducement."
— from a sworn statement given by a buyer in the FIR investigation, July 2026

Where this stands, on paper.

Two proceedings are running in parallel. Sixty-seven homebuyers filed a joint complaint that became a registered FIR. Separately, ninety allottees authorised one of their own to fight a High Court writ against the state's cancellation of the project. Nothing below is an opinion — it is what the case files say.

CASE FILE

FIR No. 134/26, Police Station EOW

Filed
9 July 2026, on a joint complaint dated 19 May 2026
Complainants
67 homebuyers of Sushant Megapolis, Dadri, District Gautam Buddh Nagar
Filed with
Joint Commissioner of Police, Economic Offences Wing, Delhi
Named entities
Ansal Hi-Tech Townships Ltd; the Uttam Steels & Associates Consortium; acting, buyers allege, for Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Ltd
Sections invoked
IPC 409 — criminal breach of trust IPC 420 — cheating IPC 120B — criminal conspiracy BNS 316(5) BNS 318(4) BNS 61(2)
On the individuals named above: a writ respondent is a party the court has been asked to hear from, not a person the court has found liable. Mr. Sushil Ansal, Mr. Pranav Ansal and Mr. Abdul Sami are named in their capacity as (former and current) directors and officers of Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Ltd, as recorded in the petition's own memo of parties. Nothing on this page is a finding against them.
CASE FILE

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27430 of 2026

Court
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
District
Gautam Budh Nagar
Petitioner
Wg. Cdr. Bhoopendra Singh Attri (Retd.) — himself an allottee, Plot No. 332, Sector 02A, and authorised representative of 90 similarly placed allottees
Filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
Named respondents (19 in total, on the record)
State of U.P. — Awas Vibhag State of U.P. — Industrial Development Bulandshahr Khurja Dev. Authority District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar Awas Bandhu U.P. RERA GNIDA Ministry of Railways Ansal Hi-Tech Townships Ltd Ansal Properties & Infrastructure Ltd Uttam Galva Steels Ltd Star Estates Management Ltd Nirman Overseas Pvt Ltd "Uttam Steels & Associates" Consortium Sushil Ansal Pranav Ansal Abdul Sami M/s C ND S Apex Pvt Ltd

Why the writ was filed

On 28 April 2026, the Principal Secretary, Awas Vibhag cancelled the Hi-Tech Township license for the "Uttam Steels & Associates" Consortium project at Dadri — the license Sushant Megapolis is built under. On 12 June 2026, the Ministry of Railways separately notified part of the project land for acquisition. Buyers are not defending the developer; they are asking the court to stop the land from being reallocated out from under them before their claims are settled, and to force someone to finish what was sold to them.

Ansal API's own 2012-13 annual report — filed while units here were being sold — names Shri Prabhunath Misra, Executive Director (Business Development) and later Managing Director, as the person who "successfully oversaw" the company's Uttar Pradesh projects, Sushant Megapolis named specifically among them. We're citing that report because it is Ansal's own public record of who was responsible, not because we obtained or verified anything beyond what the company itself published.

What the petition asks the court to do — the full prayer, (a) to (m)
  • aQuash the 28 April 2026 order cancelling the township license, and the BKDA proposal behind it, as arbitrary and unconstitutional.
  • bQuash or stay the 12 June 2026 Railways land notification, so far as it touches Sushant Megapolis project land.
  • cSet up a court-supervised Project Demarcation, Claims Verification and Completion Committee, headed by a retired judge, with representatives of the state, BKDA, GNIDA, U.P. RERA, NBCC, an independent chartered accountant, an independent civil engineer and the allottees — to verify every claim, demarcate the land, and prepare a time-bound completion plan.
  • dAppoint NBCC, or another competent public-sector developer, as successor developer to finish all eighteen sub-projects within 36 months — following the Supreme Court's approach in the Amrapali, Unitech and Supertech cases (Bikram Chatterji v. Union of India).
  • eDirect investigation and prosecution of the corporate respondents and their promoters and directors, and of any BKDA or RERA officials who failed to act over the past sixteen to seventeen years.
  • fFreeze and attach the corporate and personal assets — including bank accounts — of the developer respondents and their directors, promoters and subsidiaries, with recovery applied first to finishing the project, second to refunding allottees.
  • gBar the state from allotting, reallocating or leasing any part of the project land — for a railway project, a university, or anything else — until every allottee's claim is fully and finally settled.
  • hDirect the District Magistrate to ensure no allottee is dispossessed, no third-party rights are created, and no further sale deed, lease deed or registry is executed on the project land while the case is pending.
  • iDirect U.P. RERA to audit the registration status of all eighteen sub-projects, identify any that were never registered or have lapsed, and levy the penalties the RERA Act already provides for.
  • jEnsure completion of all eighteen sub-projects and handover of physical, habitable, legally clean possession to every allottee within 36 months of the Committee's constitution.
  • kDirect that any escalation, interest or penalty arising from the developer's own default is recovered from the defaulting respondents and their assets — never from the allottees who already paid.
  • lAny other order the court considers fit in the circumstances.
  • mAward the petitioners the costs of bringing this petition.

We have also written to the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister.

Separate from the FIR and the writ, a formal Memorandum of Representation and Complaint has been submitted directly to the Prime Minister's Office and the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, with copies to the local MP, the state Housing Department, U.P. RERA, BKDA and the district administrations of Gautam Budh Nagar and Bulandshahr. This section summarizes what that document says — it is a separate filing from the FIR and the writ described above, not a restatement of them.

175
Buyers who gave consent for this complaint, after removing duplicate submissions
~₹33.2 Cr
Recorded paid by those 175 buyers, aggregated from their own consent forms
58
Of those 175 are senior citizens, 60 years or older
2007
Earliest booking date on file among the consenting buyers
MEMORANDUM

Memorandum of Formal Representation & Complaint

Dated
21 September 2026
Addressed to
The Prime Minister of India (PMO, South Block) and the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh
Copied to
Dr. Mahesh Sharma, MP (Gautam Buddha Nagar); Principal Secretary, Housing & Urban Planning, U.P.; Chairman, U.P. RERA; Vice Chairman, BKDA; District Magistrates of Gautam Budh Nagar and Bulandshahr
Filed under
U.P. Hi-Tech Township Policy, 2003 / 2007

The subject line of the memorandum is direct: it asks for government takeover of the project under the same model already used for a comparable Ansal project in Lucknow, and names a "chronic 17-year delay, large-scale builder fraud, administrative & regulatory lapses, loss of state revenue" as the basis for that ask.

A separate FIR, on a separate track

The memorandum documents a second, distinct FIR from the one described above — different police station, different number, different date. We're stating both plainly rather than merging them:

This memorandum's FIR
FIR No. 0119/2025, P.S. Dadri, registered 5 March 2025 — IPC 420, 406, 467 & 468, against Sushil Ansal, Pranav Ansal and Shahzad Ahmed
The FIR described earlier on this page
FIR No. 134/26, P.S. Economic Offences Wing, Delhi, registered 9 July 2026 — IPC 409, 420, 120B and BNS provisions

What BKDA itself says the developer owes

The memorandum's appendix reproduces a financial claim BKDA has itself filed, in a recovery certificate and an NCLT Form-C submission:

Land conversion / CLU charges
₹198.94 Cr — BKDA Recovery Certificate, 4 March 2025
City development charges
₹13.04 Cr — Principal Secretary Order, 28 April 2026
Time extension charges (5 years)
₹9.96 Cr — BKDA NCLAT Form-C filing
25% mortgaged land, at DM circle rate
₹1,466 Cr — mortgage deeds and security bonds

Total financial claim before NCLT: ₹1,687.94 Cr — BKDA's own claim in Form-C, 24 March 2025.

Other proceedings the memorandum places on record

UP RERA
25 registered sub-projects, 7 currently in RERA abeyance, 482 pending buyer complaints, a tower-sealing order dated 17 January 2023
NCLAT, New Delhi
Comp. App. 500 & 502/2025 (order 7 Jan 2026) upheld insolvency proceedings against the group but confined their scope to Lucknow and Rajasthan projects — Dadri/Megapolis was kept out
Railway land notification
S.O. 3034(E), dated 12 June 2026, under Section 20D of the Railways Act — the same notification the writ separately challenges

The precedent the memorandum points to

The memorandum's central ask — government takeover, on an LDA/BKDA/UPAVP/NBCC model — isn't hypothetical. It cites an existing state decision: for Sushant Golf City in Lucknow, developed by the same Ansal API group under the same Hi-Tech Township Policy, the U.P. government and Lucknow Development Authority approved a ₹2,211 Cr Cabinet proposal to take the project over and complete ₹1,693.90 Cr of unfinished infrastructure. The memorandum asks for the same model to be applied at Dadri.

What the memorandum asks for
  • 1Immediate government takeover of Sushant Megapolis, execution assigned to a public agency such as NBCC or UP Awas Vikas Parishad, under a court-monitored committee, to finish the project within 24 to 36 months.
  • 2Emergency deployment of basic infrastructure on registered plot sectors — motorable roads, drinking water, sewage treatment, and raising the power load from the current 10 MVA to the required 23 MVA.
  • 3Protection of allottees' legal title and possession, and an express bar on any further third-party land transfer, power-of-attorney alienation, or the Railway land notification proceeding, until every buyer claim is settled.
  • 4Regularisation of unregistered plot pockets by RERA and BKDA, and attachment of the promoters' personal and corporate assets — including release of frozen Enforcement Directorate accounts — to satisfy pending NCDRC and RERA refund decrees.
  • 5A complete freeze on any further EDC/IDC escalation charges, time-extension penalties or interest demanded from allottees, until basic livable amenities are actually working on site.
Lead representatives named on the memorandum: Wg. Cdr. Bhoopendra Singh Attri (Retd.), Animesh Kumar Amritlal Sonkar, Anil Kumar Garg, Atul Nigam and Rakesh Sharma are named on the document itself as lead representatives and authorised co-signatories, submitting it on behalf of the consenting allottees. We're naming them because the memorandum itself is a public document addressed to government offices and names them in that role; we are not publishing their personal phone numbers or home addresses, which appear on the original document but serve no purpose here.

175 buyers, in their own booking dates and unit numbers.

This is the underlying list of allottees who gave consent for the PMO and CM memorandum, compiled from their own consent-form submissions. As with the roster further down this page, names, phone numbers and email addresses are held privately by the case team and are not published here — only the booking date, unit number and amount paid.

Booking dateUnit / Plot No.Amount paid

Why this isn't just 175 families' problem.

Sushant Megapolis isn't an isolated bad actor — it's one entry in a much larger, well-documented national pattern. That matters beyond the buyers directly affected, because a large and growing share of the money going into Indian real estate now comes from Non-Resident Indians, and confidence is the one thing a case like this spends.

Who these 175 families actually are

Before the statistics, three things worth knowing about the people behind this case:

  • ·Several of the affected buyers are, by the case team's account, retired defence forces officers. What's documented on the record: the writ petition itself is brought by Wg. Cdr. Bhoopendra Singh Attri (Retd.) — a retired Indian Air Force officer — acting as the authorised representative of ninety other allottees.
  • ·Many are older buyers who booked in their 40s and 50s expecting to retire into this project. By the case team's own count, three buyers named in this case have since died while still waiting — for a home, or at minimum a refund, that never came.
  • ·Several buyers put in what they describe, in their own sworn statements, as their life savings — and are now paying rent elsewhere because the home they paid for was never delivered in time. That isn't a one-off: it's the same "double blow" — EMI or lost savings on one side, rent on the other — that independent reports on India's stalled housing crisis describe nationally.

The money NRIs are being asked to trust

Many of the buyers on this page are themselves NRIs — the booking and ledger documents for this project list addresses in the United States and elsewhere abroad, and buyers with "NRI" recorded as their status. That's not a coincidence; NRI capital has become a defining part of the Indian housing market.

$14.9B → $16.3B
NRI investment into Indian real estate, 2024 to 2025 (projected)
Source: industry estimates reported by ghar.tv / NAR-linked market trackers, 2025
~10% → ~20%
NRI share of total Indian real estate investment, 2019 to 2025
Source: NoBroker / Knight Frank estimates, as reported 2024–25
$144.79B
Remittances into India, FY26 — the world's largest inflow, part of the same pool of trust
Source: RBI data, reported by Business Standard

None of this is abstract for the diaspora buyers on this page. Someone earning and saving abroad, choosing to put that money into a home in India rather than anywhere else, is making a bet on the country as much as the project. Every case like this one — an FIR, a stalled site, a cancelled license — is a public, searchable data point the next NRI buyer finds when they do the same due diligence we didn't get to do in 2013.

A pattern, not an outlier

Sushant Megapolis sits inside a national backlog of stalled housing that is large enough that the central government has twice set up dedicated bailout funds to unstick it.

1,626 projects
~4.32 lakh homes stalled across 15 major locations, nationally
Source: JRL Money analysis, reported by Business Standard, Sept 2025
₹10.79 lakh crore
Buyer capital estimated locked in those stalled projects — roughly 3.3% of India's entire nominal GDP, sitting idle rather than circulating
Source: JRL Money / Business Standard, Sept 2025; GDP base ₹331 lakh crore, Govt. of India FY25 estimate
₹40,000 Cr
Central government rescue funds set up for stalled projects: ₹25,000 Cr AIF (2019) and ₹15,000 Cr SWAMIH Fund-2 (2025)
Source: Union Budget announcements, 2019 and 2025

The bill, in numbers we can source

Real estate is one of the largest single contributors to India's economy — commonly estimated at 7–8% of GDP directly, and considerably more once construction materials, finance and allied services are counted in. A sector that size does not stall quietly.

What stalled capital already costs, every year — not our estimate, a published one
If the buyer capital stuck in stalled projects nationally were entirely debt-financed, at 9% interest₹97,000 Cr / year
If half of it is debt-financed — a more realistic assumption₹48,600 Cr / year
That's money households pay in EMIs on homes they can't live in, while also paying rent elsewhere— every year, ongoing
Figures as published by Vijai Mantri, co-founder of JRL Money, based on ~4.32 lakh stalled homes at an average ticket size of ₹2.5 crore (Business Standard, September 2025). We're citing this because it's a sourced, named estimate — not a number we calculated ourselves — and it only counts the direct carrying cost to buyers, not the foregone construction jobs, material sales, or tax revenue a finished project would have generated.

Real estate directly employs an estimated 70 million people in India, second only to agriculture (NAREDCO estimate). Every stalled sub-project is construction work, material orders and wages that don't happen — on top of the buyers who don't get homes. We're not going to put a single confident rupee figure on what that costs the national economy each year; nobody has published one we'd trust enough to repeat. What is published, and cited above, is enough to show the scale is not small.

One ledger is a dispute. Seventy units is a pattern.

This is the unit-by-unit roster compiled so far across the FIR, the writ, and the RERA and NCDRC complaints filed alongside them — every project, tower and plot number on file, with what each buyer paid. Names, phone numbers and email addresses are held privately by the case team and are not published here. If your unit isn't listed yet, that's exactly why the "Join the case" section below exists.

70
Units on the roster so far
₹11.59 Cr
Recorded paid, across those units
18
Sub-projects named across the roster
0
Names published on this page
Project / TowerUnit / Plot No.Amount paid

If you booked at Sushant Megapolis, this file is for you too.

We are gathering buyers into one record: ledgers, receipts, call notices, correspondence. The more units on file, the stronger the case in front of the court and the police. Send your details below, or reach us directly by email.

Clicking this opens your own email app with these details filled in and addressed to sccaseansal@gmail.com — you'll still need to hit send from there. Nothing is transmitted from this page directly.

Help this reach other buyers

Most buyers who booked at Sushant Megapolis found out about the project through word of mouth or a newspaper ad, the same way we did. A share does more to find them than another email to Ansal.

Write to us directly

Other buyers, journalists, lawyers, and anyone from Ansal who would like to respond — this inbox is open. Every contact point on this page — the form above, this address, and the link in the footer — leads to the same place: this inbox, checked by the case team.

sccaseansal@gmail.com